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The Ban on Broadcast Cigarette
Advertisements
By Kim C. CRANSTON*
During the 1960's, the health hazards of cigarette smoking
became an issue of national concern.' In the last half of that
decade several efforts were made to decrease United States
cigarette consumption by reducing the impact of cigarette com-
mercials. First, in 1966, Congress required a health warning
label on cigarette packages.2 Then, in 1967 the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC) required broadcasters that
carried cigarette advertisements to carry anti-smoking
messages.3 Finally, Congress enacted the Public Health Ciga-
rette Smoking Act of 19691 (the Act), which made it "unlawful
to advertise cigarettes on any medium of electronic communi-
cations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission" after January 1, 1971.
In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,s six corporations
which owned and operated radio stations sought both to enjoin
the enforcement of the Act and to have it declared unconstitu-
tional prior to its effective date, on the grounds that the Act
violated the First Amendment by prohibiting the "dissemina-
tion of information with respect to a lawfully sold product";6
and that the Act violated the due process protection of the
Fifth Amendment by drawing an "arbitrary and invidious" dis-
tinction between the print and electronic media.' The district
* Member, Class of 1979.
1. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Report of the Advisory Committee
to the Surgeon, Public Health Service Publication No. 1103 (1974).
2. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (1965), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (effective Jan. 1, 1966, amended 1970). The required
warning stated: "CAUTION: CIGARETTE SMOKING MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR
HEALTH."
3. FIC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act,
at 5 (June 30, 1969).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1976)).
5. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), affd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Klein-
dienst, Acting Attorney General, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
6. Id. at 584.
7. Id. at 585.
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court, in a decision that has had far-reaching effects, denied the
request for an injunction and rejected the broadcasters' argu-
ments.8
Capital has been relied upon as authority for various prop-
ositions: that although "freedom of communicating informa-
tion and disseminating opinion enjoys the fullest protection of
the First Amendment," the Constitution affords less protection
to purely commercial advertising;9 that "product advertising is
less vigorously protected than other forms of speech"; 0 that
commercial advertising has been "consistently regulated in the
past";" and that the unique characteristics of the electronic
media render them especially subject to regulation in the pub-
lic interest.'2 In addition, it has been asserted that Capital up-
holds a ban on speech even where the advertised product is
lawful and where there is no consistent policy to discourage
the sale of the product.1 3
Subsequent to the Capital decision, the case law with re-
spect to the First Amendment protection afforded commercial
speech has changed substantially.14 Product advertising now
receives much greater protection.
This Note will assess the Capital decision in light of the cur-
rent law and suggest that a court deciding the case today
would hold the ban on broadcast cigarette advertisements to
be violative of the First Amendment. The first part of the Note
contains a background of the case. The second part of the Note
considers the First Amendment challenge that the broadcast-
8. Id.
9. United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 121 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir. 1972); Holiday Magic, Inc. v. Warren,
357 F. Supp. 20, 24 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
10. Fur Information & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E.F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp.
16, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94, 101
(N.D. Cal. 1975).
11. In re National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 88 F.T.C. 84, 165 (1976).
12. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825 n.10 (1975); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as Virginia Pharmacy]; Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 429 U.S. 813 (1977).
13. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971).
14. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Note, Purely Commercial Speech and Its
Relationship to the First Amendment, 37 LA. L. REV. 263 (1977); Pitofsky, Beyond Na-




ers brought against the ban and the court's response thereto.
The Note then suggests how the ban might be challenged today
as violating the First Amendment, and how a court might eval-
uate such a challenge. This leads into a discussion of alterna-
tives to the total prohibition on broadcast cigarette
advertisements that Congress might have considered."
I
The Prohibition of Cigarette Advertising
In 1964 the average United States resident or overseas mili-
tary personnel 18 years of age or older smoked over half a pack
of cigarettes a day.'" That year a national controversy over the
hazards of smoking began with the release of the Surgeon Gen-
eral's report on the harmful effects of smoking on health."
The report observed that the 1955 Current Population Survey
showed that 68 percent of the male population and 32.4 percent
of the female population 18 years of age and older were regular
cigarette smokers.'8 It also observed that in the United States
during 1962, 557,918 deaths were caused by degenerative and
arteriosclerotic heart disease, including coronary disease,
68,176 deaths were caused by hypertensic hearth disease,
41,376 deaths were caused by lung cancer, and 15,104 deaths
were caused by bronchitis and emphysema. 9
The report provided several conclusions as to the effects of
cigarette smoking on health. Generally, it found that "cigarette
smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain
specific diseases and the overall death rate."2 0 More particu-
larly, the report found that "[cIigarette smoking is the most
important of the causes of chronic bronchitis in the United
States, and increases the risk of dying from chronic bronchitis
and emphysema,"2 ' and that "[a]lthough a causal relationship
has not been established, higher mortality of cigarette smokers
15. The Fifth Amendment challenge the broadcasters offered in opposition to the
ban would not have to be addressed by the court, because the First Amendment viola-
tion alone would serve to prohibit enforcement of the Act.
16. See text accompanying notes 25-26, infra.
17. U.S. Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Report of the Advisory Committee
to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service: Smoking and Health, Public
Health Service Publication No. 1103 (1964).
18. Id. at 26.
19. Id. at 26, Table 1.
20. Id. at 32.
21. Id.
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is associated with many other cardiovascular diseases."2 2 The
report further found that "[ciigarette smoking is associated
with a 70 percent increase in the age-specific death rate of
males." 2 3 Further findings with reference to male smokers
were that "[ci igarette smoking is causally related to lung can-
cer. . . [and] the magnitude of the effect of cigarette smoking
far outweighs all other factors."2 4 Finally, the report deter-
mined that "male cigarette smokers have a higher death rate
from coronary artery disease than non-smoking males." 25
Despite the report and subsequent efforts by the government
to reduce cigarette consumption, the public was not easily per-
suaded to kick its smoking habit. Immediately following the
release of the Surgeon General's report, cigarette sales sharply
declined. But, by the final quarter of that same year, they had
recovered to the extent that for the entire year of 1964, total
United States cigarette consumption was down only 2.5 per-
cent and adult per capita consumption was down only 3.5 per-
cent from the 1964 high. 26 This rally in sales continued and by
1967 the per capita consumption of cigarettes had recovered
22. Id.
23. Id. at 31.
24. The report specifically noted that "[i]n comparison with non-smokers, average
male smokers of cigarettes have approximately a 9- to 10-fold risk of developing lung
cancer and heavy smokers at least a 20-fold risk." Id. at 31.
25. Id. at 32.
26. R. MILLER, A DECADE OF GOVERNMENT ACTIONs RELATING TO SMOKING AND
HEALTH, 1964-1974, at 26 (1974). The following chart illustrates two measures of ciga-
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FTC, Statistical Supplement to Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress Pursu-
ant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, Tables 1 & 2 (Dec. 1, 1974).
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about one-half of the 1964 drop,2 7 despite the fact that begin-
ning in 1966 a health warning label was required on each pack-
age of cigarettes. 28 Consequently, in 1969, the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) concluded that the warning statement ap-
pearing on cigarette packages had not significantly changed at-
titudes or habits during its three and one-half years of
existence.2 9
In 1967, the Federal Communications Commission required
broadcasters that carried cigarette commercials to provide a
"significant amount of time" to programs or announcements
concerning the health hazards of smoking.30 This ruling was
affirmed in Banzhaf v. FCC.3 1 Following the Banzhaf decision
the broadcast media began carrying effective anti-smoking
commercials. Concurrently, statistics began to show a sus-
tained decline in cigarette consumption.3 2 The effectiveness of
the anti-smoking messages placed the cigarette companies in a
precarious position. Cigarette advertising seemed to be effec-
tive in inducing smokers to use particular brands, but it did not
seem to induce nonsmokers to start smoking.3 3 Judge Wright,
in his dissent in Capital, pointed out that in these circum-
stances "the individual tobacco companies could not stop ad-
vertising for fear of losing their competitive position; yet for
every dollar they spent to advance their product, they forced
the airing of more anti-smoking advertisements and hence lost
more customers."3 4
The Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Commerce met in 1969 to consider new cigarette legislation be-
cause it felt that there was new evidence that more stringent
27. Id.
28. See note 2, supra.
29. FI'C, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act,
at 5 (June 30, 1969).
30. Letter from FCC to Television Station WCBS-TV (June 2, 1967). This FCC po-
sition was affirmed in a Memorandum, reprinted at 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967). Opinion and
Order, In re Television Station WCBS-TV, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967). The FCC concluded
that aside from the Fairness Doctrine, its ruling was required by the public interest.
Id. at 949. The FCC decision was affirmed in Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). However, in 1971, the Fourth Circuit upheld an
FCC ruling that "smoking and health" had ceased to be a controversial issue. Larus &
Brother Co., Inc. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971).
31. 405 F.2d 1082 (1968).
32. See note 26, supra.
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controls were required,"3 and because both the FCC3 6 and the
FTC37 were considering independent action. A representative
of the cigarette industry suggested that the subcommittee
draft an antitrust exemption permitting the companies to
agree amongst themselves to remove their advertisements
from the air. Judge Wright stated in his dissent in Capital
that this suggestion by the cigarette companies was not sur-
prising in light of the fact that "the Banzhaf ruling had clearly
made electronic media advertising a losing proposition for the
industry, and a voluntary withdrawal would have saved the
35. HEW, Report to Congress, 1969; FI'C Report to Congress, 1967, as reported in
H.R. Rep. No. 91-666, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1969).
36. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582. The FCC was consider-
ing rules that would have prohibited cigarette advertising on electronic media. See
FCC Notice of Proposed Rule Making, FCC Docket No. 18434, 34 Fed. Reg. 1959 (1969);
Hearing Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce,
91st Cong., 1st Sess., 154 (July 22, 1969) (testimony of FCC Chairman, Rosel H. Hyde).
37. FTC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act
(June 30, 1967). The FTC recommended that Congress enact legislation that would
have required a warning statement to appear in all cigarette advertisements as well as
on all cigarette packages, which would have read:
"WARNING: CIGARETTE SMOKING Is DANGEROUS TO HEALTH AND MAY CAUSE
DEATH FROM CANCER AND OTHER DISEASES."
Id. at 30. The FTC also recommended that the legislation require (1) a statement set-
ting forth the tar and nicotine content of each cigarette on cigarette packages and in all
cigarette advertising, (2) increased appropriations to the Department of Health, Edu-
cation, and Welfare for education of the public about the health hazards of smoking,
and (3) appropriations for research under the direction of the National Institute of
Health on developing less hazardous cigarettes.
By 1969, the FTC recommended more stringent measures. See FTC, Report to Con-
gress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act (June 30, 1969). It recom-
mended, in addition to the appropriations and tar and nicotine disclosures suggested
in 1967:
(2) Requiring the following warning to be included clearly and prominently
on cigarette packages and in all cigarette advertising:
"WARNING: CIGARETTE SMOKING Is DANGEROUS To HEALTH AND MAY
CAUSE DEATH FROM CANCER, CORONARY HEART DISEASE,
CHRONIC BRONCHITIS, PULMONARY EMPHYSEMA AND OTHER
DISEASES."
(3) Banning cigarette advertising on television and radio entirely, and re-
quiring television and radio broadcasters, as part of their public service
responsibilities, to devote a significant amount of broadcast time for pro-
grams and announcements on health hazards of cigarette smoking.
Id. at 35.
38. See Hearing Before the Consumer Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 78 (July 22, 1969) (testimony of Mr. Cullman): "The
cigarette companies requested an antitrust exemption so they could reach an agree-
ment among themselves not to advertise on the electronic media without fear of prose-
cution for restraint of trade."
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companies approximately $250,000,000 in advertising costs, 39 re-
lieved political pressure for FTC action and removed most anti-
smoking messages from the air."40
Under these circumstances Congress passed the Act,"
prohibiting the advertisement of cigarettes on electronic
broadcast media under the jurisdiction of the FCC. This prohi-
bition effectively removed the requirement of airing anti-smok-
ing messages. Since then, per capita consumption of cigarettes
has steadily increased.4 2
II
The First Amendment Challenge
The six radio broadcasters that initiated Capital sought a
permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Congres-
sional ban on the advertisements and a declaration that the
ban was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because
it prohibited the dissemination of information with respect to a
lawfully sold product. A three-judge district court was con-
vened to hear the case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2282 and 2284.43 The
court, in assessing the plaintiffs' First Amendment challenge,
first reviewed the context in which the legislation was passed.
It then dismissed the challenge as meritless, relying on the
traditional commercial speech doctrine-under which product
39. In fact, despite the prohibition on cigarette advertising in the broadcast media,
cigarette companies have not significantly decreased the amounts they spend on ad-
vertising. Domestic cigarette advertising expenditures were $305.9 milliQn in 1969,
$314.7 million in 1970, $251.6 million in 1971, $257.6 million in 1972, $247.5 million in 1973,
and $306.8 million in 1974. FTC, Statistical Supplement to FTC Report to Congress
Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, table 7 (Dec. 31, 1974). Figures
for advertising expenditures since 1974 are not available because the six major domes-
tic cigarette producers have refused to file required special reports with the FIC. FIC,
Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, at 2 (1976).
40. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 588 (Wright, J., dissent-
ing).
41. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87
(1970). See text accompanying note 4, supra.
42. FTC, Statistical Supplement to FTC Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act, at 5 (Dec. 31, 1974). See text accompanying note 25,
supra.
43. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 583 (D.D.C. 1971). 28
U.S.C. § 2282 (1976) (repealed Pub. L. 94-381, §§ 1-2, Aug. 12, 1976, 90 Stat. 1119) provided
that a three-judge district court should hear and determine requests for interlocutory
or permanent injunctions restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of Acts
of Congress on grounds of unconstitutionality before they were granted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2284 (1976) provides in relevant part that: "(a) A district court of three judges shall
be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress."
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advertising received little First Amendment protection-and
on the unique characteristics of the broadcast media."
In reviewing the circumstances in which the legislation was
passed, the opinion first noted that in 1965, Congress, in an at-
tempt to alert the public to the dangers of cigarette smoking,
had passed legislation requiring a health warning on cigarette
packages;45 that by 1969 there was evidence that more stringent
controls were required;4 6 and that both the FCC and the FTC
were considering independent action." These were the pri-
mary circumstances which the court felt prompted Congress to
enact the Act prohibiting the advertising of cigarettes on any
electronic communication medium.48
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
In response to the allegation that the ban on advertising im-
posed by the Act prohibited the "dissemination of information
with respect to a lawfully sold product . .. in violation of the
First Amendment, 0 the court stated that "[iut is established
that product advertising is less vigorously protected than other
44. In Capital, the plaintiffs argued that the attempt by Congress to classify media
in two categories-those subject to prohibitions and those not-contravenes the Fifth
Amendment because the distinctions are arbitrary and invidious. 333 F. Supp. at 585.
The Capital court stated that "[ti here exists a rational basis for placing a ban on ciga-
rette advertisements on broadcast facilities while allowing such advertisements in
print." Id. The court found a rational basis from evidence that demonstrated that the
most persuasive advertising was being conducted on broadcast media, and that these
advertisements were particularly effective in reaching large audiences of young peo-
ple. Id. at 585-86.
It is interesting that among the evidence relied upon was the expert testimony of
Joseph Cullman, Chairman of Philip Morris, Inc., who stated: "I think further that
broadcast is quite different from print media. We think the print media appeals to a
more adult person and as such is a more appropriate place for cigarette ads." Id. at
586, n.13. In addition, the court stated in dicta that there are significant differences
between the broadcast media and print, including the fact that the public owns the
airwaves and that licensees must operate in the public interest under the supervision
of the FCC. Id. at 586.
45. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (amended 1970). See note 2, supra. The 1970 amendment
changed the required warning to: "WARNING: THE SURGEON GENERAL HAS DETER-
MINED THAT CIGARETTE SMOKING Is DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEALTH." Public Health Cig-
arette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970).
46. See S. Rep. No. 566, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6 (1969).
47. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 583-84.
48. Id. at 584.
49. Petition for Permanent Injunction at 4, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
50. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
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forms of speech."5' This statement regarding the First Amend-
ment protection afforded to product advertising represents a
general description of the commercial speech doctrine. The
cases relied on by the court applied and interpreted the doc-
trine in a variety of circumstances.
Valentine v. Chrestensen," one of the first cases in the devel-
opment of the commercial speech doctrine, upheld the applica-
tion of a New York City Sanitary Code provision prohibiting
the distribution of commercial and business advertising mate-
rial in the streets. Valentine held the city could constitution-
ally prohibit the owner of a submarine used as an exhibit from
distributing handbills advertising the exhibit and containing a
political protest, where the political protest was included with
the intent of evading the code provision." The Court stated
that the streets are proper places for the exercise of freedom of
speech and the government may regulate the exercise of that
freedom in the public interest, but not so as to unduly burden
or proscribe it." The Court further stated, however, that the
Constitution imposes no such restriction on government regu-
lation of purely commercial advertising."
The next major case in the development of the commercial
speech doctrine was Murdock v. Pennsylvania." It recognized
the right of states to prohibit the use of streets for the distribu-
tion of purely commercial leaflets, even though the leaflets
have a civic appeal attached to them." However, it held that
the doctrine could not be applied in the case at issue to pro-
hibit the distribution of leaflets in the streets when the. leaflet-
ting was done in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity,
despite the fact that the leaflets also invited the purchase of
religious materials."
The commercial speech doctrine was further developed in
Breard v. City of Alexandria."o In this case, the Court held
51. Id.
52. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
53. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
54. Id. at 55.
55. Id. at 54.
56. Id.
57. 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
58. Id. at 110-11.
59. Id. at 111.
60. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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that a city ordinance regulating solicitors and peddlers on the
ground that such persons entering private residences without
invitation constituted a nuisance did not abridge constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech.6 ' The Court stated that, on
balance, the desire of some householders for privacy out-
weighed a publisher's right to distribute publications by way of
subscriptions solicited in house-to-house canvassing.6 2 The
Court concluded that it would be a misuse of the freedoms of
speech and press to allow those guarantees to force a commu-
nity to admit uninvited solicitors of publications into their
homes."
The last case relied on by the Capital court for its statement
of the commercial speech doctrine, Banzhaf v. FCC," held that
the FCC did not unconstitutionally abridge First Amendment
freedom of speech by requiring radio and television broadcast-
ers that carry cigarette advertising to devote significant
amounts of time to the broadcast of programming that discour-
ages cigarette smoking." The Court reasoned that the speech
that might have been "chilled" by the FCC requirement, ciga-
rette advertisements, was entitled to only minimal constitu-
tional protection since it was product advertising.66 Further,
the Court found that the requirement of anti-smoking
messages promoted rather than inhibited First Amendment
values by fostering a balanced debate on a matter of public im-
portance and by affirmatively providing information relevant to
that debate.
While the cases relied upon by the Capital court have not
been overruled, the commercial speech doctrine which they
supported has been substantially eroded," perhaps to the
point of its disappearance, 69 by a line of cases that afforded
61. Id. at 645.
62. Id. at 644.
63. Id. at 645.
64. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
65. Id. at 1101.
66. Id. at 1102.
67. Id.
68. See text accompanying note 14, supra.
69. See Note, Purely Commercial Speech and Its Relationship to the First Amend-
ment, 37 LA. L. REV. 263, 263-64 (1976). But see Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and
Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Should They Be Retained?, 1 CoMM/ENr L.J. 65, 71
(1977) (suggesting that the inroads made upon the commercial speech doctrine have
been restricted to cases where the communicated information was protected because
the public had a need to know).
342 [Vol. 2
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varying degrees of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech.o
In Bigelow v. Virgina the Court for the first time expressed
its dissatisfaction with the traditional approach of resolving a
certain class of First Amendment claims by simply catego-
rizing the speech as "commercial,"7 1 stating that "[r egardless
of the particular label . . . a court may not escape the task of
assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and weighing
it against the public interest allegedly served by the regula-
tion."72 Using that approach the Court concluded that Virginia
could not constitutionally punish the publisher of a newspaper
for printing an abortion referral agency's paid advertisement
which both promoted the agency's services and contained in-
formation about the availability of abortions.7 3
Another inroad made upon the commercial speech doctrine
came in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., where the Court held that commercial
speech is not wholly unprotected by the First Amendment.7 4
While recognizing that some forms of commercial speech regu-
lation, such as the proscription of false or misleading advertis-
ing, are permissible," the Court held that Virginia's ban on the
advertising of prescription drug prices by pharmacists was un-
constitutional under the balancing test required by Bigelow."
Finally, in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro7 7 the Supreme Court held that an ordinance prohibit-
ing the posting of "For Sale" and "Sold" signs for the purpose
of containing what the township perceived to be the flight of
white homeowners from their racially integrated community,
impaired "the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial infor-
70. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
71. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 826.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 829.
74. 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
75. Id. at 771.
76. In reaching its conclusion, the Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that "the spe-
cial problems of the electronic broadcast media are likewise not in this case." Id. at
773. The Court thus avoided consideration of the special problems of advertising in the
electronic media. Id. at 773. See also Capital Broadcasting Co., v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. at 586. See note 44, supra.
77. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
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mation" and was therefore constitutionally infirm."
While the precise impact of the above-described cases upon
the commercial speech doctrine is somewhat in dispute,
clearly the Capital court's statement that "[iit is established
that product advertising is less vigorously protected than other
forms of speech"o lacks the support that it had in 1971.
In further assessing the petitioners' First Amendment argu-
ment, the Capital court stated that the unique characteristics
of electronic communication make it especially subject to regu-
lation in the public interest."' The court then asserted that
Congress has the power to prohibit the advertising of ciga-
rettes in any medium, and that the validity of other similar ad-
vertising regulations imposed by federal regulatory agencies
has been repeatedly upheld." It appears, however, that the ad-
vertising regulations involved in the cases relied upon by the
court" are distinguishable from the advertising regulation in-
volved in Capital.
B. Advertising and Unlawful Activities
On a factual level, each of the cases relied upon was con-
cerned with the regulation of the advertising of unlawful activi-
ties, conduct closely related to unlawful activites, or of
unlawful advertising techniques.
New York State Broadcasters Association v. United States
upheld a ban on the broadcasting of lottery information. In
reaching its decision, the court noted that the prohibition
under consideration followed over a hundred years of history
78. Id. at 98.
79. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text, supra.
80. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
81. Id. While for the purposes of this Note this statement is relatively unimpor-
tant, one of the cases relied upon by the court raises an interesting question. NBC v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), held that since radio is not available to all, i.e., since
there are a limited number of radio broadcast frequencies, radio could be regulated in
the public interest with references to licensing and convenience. Id. at 226-27. See
Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regula-
tion of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976). This author suggests that the degree
of First Amendment protection afforded a speaker can be limited, and cites statistics
indicating the relative availability of various communications media.
82. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
83. New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937);
Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d 977 (D.D.C. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964);
United States v. Re, 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964).
84. 414 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1969).
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during which there had been prohibitions regarding various as-
pects of lotteries." To avoid confusion as to the view taken of
the activity that the FTC was regulating, the court stated that,
without suggesting that lotteries are a swindle (the First
Amendment does not protect freedom to swindle) or that lot-
teries and uncontrolled sales of narcotics (certain advertise-
ments for which could be constitutionally banned) are equally
deserving of condemnation, Congress has the power to have a
"view" as to these types of conduct and to take steps to inhibit
each." Further the court stated there was no doubt that Con-
gress intended to prohibit the broadcasting of lottery informa-
tion regardless of the legality of the lottery under local law. 7
The broadcasting of lottery information, which was regulated
in New York State Broadcasters, was closely related to lotter-
ies, an activity which is unlawful in some circumstances. 8 In
sharp contrast, smoking is a lawful activity, not related to any
unlawful activity, yet Capital upheld the prohibition of tobacco
advertising."
The second "similar" advertising regulation relied upon by
the Capital court was dealt with in FTC v. Standard Education
Society" and Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC." In Standard Educa-
tion Society, the respondents falsely represented to prospec-
tive purchasers of their publications the prices that would be
charged.92 In Giant Food, the use of the term "manufacturer's
list price" in advertising was held to be false and deceptive
when it represented to the public that that was the price at
which other stores in the area usually sold the product.9 3
Again, these two cases relied upon by the Capital court were
both concerned with unlawful activities in that they were un-
85. Id. at 995.
86. Id. at 997.
87. Id. at 996.
88. Id.
89. Brief for Appellant at 2, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582
(D.D.C. 1971).
90. 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
91. 322 F.2d 977 (D.D.C. 1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967 (1964). These cases con-
cerned the validity of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Under this sec-
tion, "unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce are declared unlawful," and the FTC is empowered to prevent
the same. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
at 584 n.8.
92. 302 U.S. at 114.
93. 322 F.2d at 981.
1979] 345
CoMm/ENT
fair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce.94 The cigarette
advertisements regulated in Capital, however, unlike the ad-
vertisements in Giant Food and Standard Education Society,
were not unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."
The third kind of "similar" advertising regulation relied upon
by the Capital court was considered in United States v. Re.9 6
Here, the court upheld section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933,"
which empowers the Securities Exchange Commission to reg-
ulate information disclosed in soliciting stock." The Securities
Act of 1933 proscribed the sale of unregistered stock by an "un-
derwriter" who provides an outlet for the stock of an "issuer."99
Essentially, Re was concerned with the illegal sale of unregis-
tered stock. Thus, the advertising regulation upheld in Re was
concerned with the advertising of an unlawful activity, a cir-
cumstance which again distinguishes that case from Capital.
C. Policy Considerations
Each of the advertising regulations and cases relied on in
Capital may be further distinguished from the ban on ciga-
rette advertising because of general policy considerations.
These regulations were based upon a clear Congressional pol-
icy proscribing either the advertising method,100 the activity, or
an activity related to the activity being advertised.o' In the
case of the prohibition on advertising cigarettes on electronic
media, it can be argued that there is no cogent government pol-
icy with reference to cigarette smoking.1 02 The plaintiffs in
Capital contended that the Public Health Cigarette Act of 1969
is "anarchy":
Purporting merely to "inform" the public of the alleged
hazards of smoking, it, in fact, bans advertising in the elec-
94. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
95. The government had not made such an allegation, though it could have done
so. See note 129 and text accompanying notes 214-22, infra.
96. 336 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904 (1964). See Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976).
98. 333 F. Supp. at 584 n.9.
99. See United States v. Re, 336 F.2d at 309; Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. at 584.
100. See Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC, 322 F.2d at 981.
101. See New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United States, 414 F.2d at 985; United
States v. Re, 336 F.2d at 309.
102. See Brief for Plaintiff at 7-9, 12-13, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F.
Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
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tronic media while preserving it and protecting it in the print
media; it also hopelessly conflicts with other Congressional en-
actments which provide the tobacco industry with price sup-
port and otherwise are designed to encourage and promote
cigarette consumption. 03
In support of this contention, the plaintiffs pointed to the Ag-
riculture Act of 1949,04 which maintains the continued growth
and sale of tobacco by price supports and stabilization, and to
Department of Agriculture programs that assist the tobacco in-
dustry by: (1) paying subsidies to exporters of tobacco; (2)
spending money in countries where tobacco is a government
monopoly 05 in order to promote by advertisement those gov-
ernment brands which contain American tobacco; and (3) dis-
tributing tobacco to foreign countries under the Food for Peace
program. 106
The cases relied on in Capital involved regulations sup-
ported by clear Congressional policy. The cigarette advertising
regulated in Capital itself, however, appears to lack such sup-
port.
The Capital court concluded its assessment of the petition-
ers' First Amendment challenge to the regulation, not by di-
rectly addressing the plaintiffs' argument, but by stating that
103. Id. at 12-13. See S. Rep. No. 91-566, Individual Statements of Senators Moss, et
al., as cited in Brief for Plaintiff at 12, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582 (D.D.C. 1971).
104. 7 U.S.C. § 1445 (1976).
105. E.g., Japan, Thailand and Australia.
106. Brief for Plaintiff in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Op-
position to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Capital Broadcasting Co.
v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971).
These programs involve substantial sums of money. Thus, during fiscal 1970,
the United States Government paid a total of 29 1/2 million dollars to export-
ers, spent more than 240 thousand dollars to promote American tobacco in
countries where tobacco is a national monopoly, and distributed 14.2 million
dollars worth of tobacco on credit under the Food for Peace Program.
U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Tobacco in the National Economy, (Sept. 1971). Some com-
mentators have suggested that subsidies paid by the government to the tobacco indus-
try total about 65 million dollars. See, e.g., Gartner, The Marlboro Man and the Law,
Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1970, p. 2, col. 1. Whether the figure is actually as high as that is of
little importance; the point is that the growth of tobacco is affirmatively supported and
encouraged by the United States Government.
The government also spends 8 million a year for National Cancer Institute
research on the hazardous substances in tobacco and cigarette smoke. But,
then, in absurd contradiction, it spends 65 million a year of taxpayers' money
to subsidize and promote the growing of and sale of tobacco.
Field, Time to Crack the Tobacco Lobby, READER'S DIGEST 103 (July 1976) (original
emphasis omitted).
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the dispositive factor was that the Act had no substantial effect
on the exercise of the broadcasters' First Amendment rights;
the petitioners had lost no right to speak, but only the ability to
collect revenues from others for broadcasting their commercial
messages. 0 7 The court reasoned that the Act did not preclude
a broadcaster from airing its own point of view on the cigarette
smoking controversy and that, therefore, the Act did not con-
flict with the exercise of its First Amendment rights. 0 This
conclusion is still supported by authority,'oo so if a broadcaster
were to challenge the Act today on First Amendment grounds,
it would probably meet the same fate. However, this last con-
clusion points to the peculiar nature of the case itself. As pre-
viously noted, the tobacco industry was supporting the
advertising prohibition"o and, consequently, had no interest in
challenging its constitutionality. The reason consumers have
not challenged constitutionality of the Act was suggested by
Judge Wright in his dissent in Capital:
It would be difficult to argue that there are many who mourn
for the Marlboro Man or miss the ungrammatical Winston jin-
gles. Most television viewers no doubt agree that cigarette ad-
vertising represents the carping hucksterism of Madison
Avenue at its very worst."'
107. 333 F. Supp. at 584.
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Business Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace v. FCC, 450 F.2d 642,
654 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1972). Cf. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (newspaper pub-
lisher and editor "lacked a legitimate First Amendment interest, inasmuch as his activ-
ity was of a 'purely commercial nature,' he had no 'standing to rely upon the
hypothetical rights of those in the noncommercial zone.'" Id. at 814-15. The Court
stated that it "often has recognized that a defendant's standing to challenge a statute
on First Amendment grounds as facially overbroad does not depend upon whether his
own activity is shown to be constitutionally privileged." Id. at 815. The Court noted
that the strength of the appellant's interest was augmented by the fact that the statute
was applied against him as publisher and editor, not against the advertiser, and that
such statutes applied in that manner could impose burdens on publications that would
impair their proper functioning. The Court concluded this was analogous to the gov-
ernment acting to prevent essential free and general discussions of public matters and
that, consequently, the statute unconstitutionally infringed the appellant's First
Amendment rights. Id. at 828-29. Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1968) (recognizing the First Amendment rights of broadcasters, but holding that
rights of viewers and listeners are paramount with respect to having the broadcast
medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment).
110. See text accompanying notes 37-39, supra.
111. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 587 (Wright, J., dissent-
ing). In fact, John F. Banzhaf III, the Executive Director of Action on Smoking and
Health and the founder of Legislative Action on Smoking and Health, an organization
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Except for failing to distinguish cases having to do with ille-
gal products, it appears the court properly applied the law as it
existed when Capital was decided in holding that the advertis-
ing ban was constitutional. The noted changes in the commer-
cial speech doctrine suggest, however, that a key element of
support for the decision has been eroded by more recent deci-
sions. These changes, in combination with-the noted peculiari-
ties of the case," 2 including an apparently misplaced reliance
on distinguishable precedent, suggest that were a court decid-
ing the case today, it might reach a different result-one which
would hold the ban to be an unconstitutional violation of First
Amendment protections.
III
Constitutionality of the Act Today
In the event that consumers challenged the validity of the
cigarette advertising ban on First Amendment grounds, a court
today would be compelled to give considerable weight to the
consumers' First Amendment interests.
The Supreme Court enunciated the degree of First Amend-
ment protection afforded commercial speech in its decisions in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, Linmark, Virginia Pharmacy
and Bigelow."3 In addition to setting forth a test for weighing
the public interest served against the First Amendment inter-
ests affected by a regulation, these cases discuss several per-
missible forms of commercial speech regulation.
In determining the constitutionality of the Act today, a court
would first consider whether the Act is one of the several forms
of permissible commercial speech regulation. Under the analy-
sis suggested below, a court would conclude that the Act is not
one of the permissible forms of regulation. The court would
then probably weigh the First Amendment interests at stake
that lobbied for the anti-smoking viewpoint during the Congressional consideration of
the Act, filed a brief amicus curiae in support of upholding the constitutionality of the
Act. Mr. Banzhaf had previously filed the complaint which led to the FCC decision
requiring the airing of anti-smoking messages on broadcast media. Application of the
Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising, 9 F.C.C.2d 921 (1967), affd, Banzhaf v.
FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (1968).
112. See text accompanying note 33, supra.
113. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 380 (1977); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975). See text accompanying notes 68-79, supra.
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against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation to
determine if the Act is constitutional.
A. Permissible Forms of Commercial Speech Regulation
While commercial speech is protected, Bigelow, Virginia
Pharmacy, Linmark and Bates indicate that some forms of
commercial speech regulation are permissible.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that mere time, place
and manner restrictions were proper provided that they were
"justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest and
that in so doing they left open ample alternative channels for
communication of the information."' 14 In Virginia Pharmacy,
as in Capital, no assertion was made by the government that
the regulation before the Court was a mere time, place and
manner restriction."s Even if such an assertion had been
made, the Court stated that the Virginia statute, which singled
out speech of a particular content and sought to prevent its dis-
semination completely, had plainly exceeded the proper
bounds of time, place and manner restrictions on commercial
speech." 6 Had the government made such an assertion in Cap-
ital, it would have probably received similar treatment by the
Court because the restriction plainly singled out speech of a
particular content, advertisements for cigarettes, and did not
concern itself with all advertisements of a similar time, place
or manner. "7
Moreover, serious questions could be raised as to whether
the prohibition left open ample alternative channels for com-
munication. The alternatives left open for such advertising, in
view of the First Amendment interests of the recipients of the
communicated information,"' might be considered insufficient
for two reasons. Such advertisements are less likely to reach
persons deliberately seeking them, and they may be less effec-
tive than if they were conveyed over the broadcast media."'
114. 425 U.S. at 771.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 11, 17-18 (1976); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Town-
ship of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 93-94.
118. See text accompanying notes 150-88, infra.
119. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 430 U.S. at 93.
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Thus the ban would probably not be upheld as a mere time,
place or manner restriction.
One factor in the above analysis merits explanation. There
is no general principle that freedom of speech may be abridged
when the speaker's listeners may come by his message by
some other means, such as by seeking him out and asking him
the nature of the message.120 Nor is there any such limitation
on the independent right of the listener to receive information
sought to be communicated.1 2 ' Thus, the fact that consumers
could seek out the information conveyed by the cigarette ad-
vertisements is not relevant to a determination of the constitu-
tionality of a ban on broadcast cigarette advertisements.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court also stated that untruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has not been protected for its
own sake.12 2 This limit on the protection offered commercial
speech was not a matter of concern to the Capital court since
no contention was made that the cigarette ads were prohibited
because they were untruthful. In any event, had the govern-
ment contended that it was concerned with regulating untruth-
ful advertisements, the statutory prohibition should have
focused upon untruthful advertisements and not all cigarette
advertisements.12 3
In addition, the Virginia Pharmacy Court stated that com-
mercial speech not proven to be false, or even wholly false,
could still be regulated if it were shown to be deceptive or mis-
leading.124 In this regard the Virginia Pharmacy Court noted
that commercial speech is not entirely indistinguishable from
other forms of speech, and that there are commonsense differ-
ences between speech that does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction and other varieties of speech.125 Such
differences include the fact that the truth of commercial
speech may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than
some other kinds of speech, and that commercial speech may
be more durable than other kinds because its relationship to
commercial profits makes it less likely to be chilled by proper
120. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. at 757 n.15. But see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
121. 425 U.S. 748.
122. Id. at 771.
123. See text accompanying notes 216-41, infra.
124. 425 U.S. 748.
125. Id. at 771 n.24.
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regulation.12 6 Because of these attributes it might be appropri-
ate, as the Court implied in Linmark, to require that a com-
mercial message appear in such a form, or include such
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as to pre-
vent its being deceptive.127 However, it does not appear that
the Capital court considered the Act to be a regulation of this
kind of speech.128
It has also been held that modes of communication such as
television and radio "intrude on the privacy of the home," mak-
ing it "impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure," are more susceptible to regulation.12 9 However,
when the government undertakes selectively to shield the pub-
lic from particular types of speech on the ground that they are
more offensive than others, such restrictions have been upheld
only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home'
or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling
viewer or auditor to avoid exposure,' 3 and then only after a
delicate balancing of the First Amendment interests in-
volved.13 2 Absent the narrow circumstances described above
the burden normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid further
bombardment of his sensibilities simply by averting his
126. Id.
127. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 98; Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. at 360.
128. For regulations proposed to deal with such speech, see 29 Fed. Reg. 8325. In his
brief amicus curiae, John F. Banzhaf III asserted that Congress could have determined
that cigarette advertising is deceptive and that the Act could have been based on that
finding. Brief Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582 (D.D.C. 1971).
129. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85; Erznoznik v. City
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975). See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974); Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); Breard v. City
of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
130. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Rowan con-
cerned restrictions on speakers that intruded on the privacy of the home. The Court
upheld a federal statute permitting a person receiving an advertisement that he be-
lieves to be "erotically arousing or sexually provocative" to have the Postmaster Gen-
eral inform the sender not to mail such items in the future. The Rowan Court
emphasized that "the right of every person 'to be let alone' must be placed in the
scales with the right of others to communicate." Id. at 736-38.
131. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Lehman concerned cap-
tive unwilling viewers who were unable to avoid exposure. The Court upheld a munic-
ipality's policy barring political advertisements on city buses, recognizing that the
degree of captivity and the consequent intrusion on privacy is greater for a bus passen-
ger than for a person on the street. Id. at 302-04. (Blackmun, J., majority opinion); See
id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring).
132. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1975).
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eyes."as Although there is some indication that the Capital
court felt that the Act was related to this kind of regulation, 13 4 a
strong argument was not made on this ground. Moreover, even
if it were argued that the Act was this kind of regulation, a deli-
cate balancing of the First Amendment interests would still be
required.
Modes of communication that reach a group that the govern-
ment has a right to protect can also be restricted.13 5 It is gener-
ally accepted that the state can adopt more stringent controls
on communicative materials available to youth than on those
available to adults.'3 6 However, minors are entitled to a signifi-
cant measure of First Amendment protection,137 and only in
relatively narrow and well defined circumstances may the gov-
ernment bar public dissemination of protected materials to
them. 3 1 In addition, when the restriction impinges upon First
Amendment interests other than those of the group that the
state is attempting to protect, standards that officials use in ap-
plying the restriction must be narrowly drawn, reasonable, and
definite. 3  Although the Capital court suggests that the Act
133. Id. Arguably, in the case of broadcast advertisements, the burden would re-
quire the viewer or listener to change the channel on his television or radio. An argu-
ment can be made that with reference to "emotionally conditioning advertisements," a
viewer or listener will not be able to protect himself by simply averting his eyes or
trying to not listen to the advertisement. Reed & Coalson, Eighteenth-Century Legal
Doctrine Meets Twentieth-Century Marketing Techniques: F.T.C. Regulation of Emo-
tionally Conditioning Advertising, 11 GA. L. REV. 733, 780 n.166 (1977). Cf. FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), where, in a case involving a radio broadcast of
"indecent" language, the court states that "[tIo say that one may avoid further offense
by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the rem-
edy for an assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent
phone call, but that option does not give the caller a constitutional immunity or avoid a
harm that has already taken place." Id. at 748-49.
134. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
135. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 94; Capital Broad-
casting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
136. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1974); Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
137. See Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
138. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Rabeck v. New
York, 391 U.S. 462 (1968).
139. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684 (1968). In this
case, the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards was held to be
fatal to an ordinance which established a Motion Picture Classification Board to clas-
sify as not suitable for young persons films that portray or describe "sexual promiscu-
ity or extramarital or abnormal sexual relations in such as manner as . . . likely to
incite or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or
to appeal to their prurient interest." Films were so classified if in the Board's judg-
was meant to protect minors,140 it does not appear that the cig-
arette advertisements were considered to be the kind of inde-
cent or obscene material that this mode of regulation is
concerned with.
Furthermore, speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be sup-
pressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images that a
legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.141 The balance be-
tween the interests of youths and adults that are protected by
the First Amendment and the government's interest in prohib-
iting cigarette advertisements on broadcast media are consid-
ered later.142
Finally, speech may be shown to present such a clear and
present danger of a severe evil that the state may be justified
in suppressing that speech.'4 3 In Capital, the government ar-
gued that the prohibition on broadcast cigarette advertise-
ments was necessary because the advertisements created such
a clear and present danger. Dissenting Judge Wright stated
that the clear and present danger test has usually been con-
fined to cases where the state has asserted an overriding inter-
est in its own preservation or in the maintenance of public
order." Judge Wright went on to observe that the state's in-
terest in protecting the health of its citizens differs from an in-
terest in security because the only person directly harmed by
cigarette smoking is the person who decides to smoke.
Moreover, this argument relies upon a highly paternalistic
approach to speech regulation. An alternative, suggested by
the Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy, is "to assume that
this information is not in itself harmful, that people will per-
ceive their own best interests if only they are well enough in-
ment "there is a substantial probability that [the film] will create the impression on
young persons that such conduct is profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable,
praiseworthy or commonly accepted." The Court held that the failure to limit the term
"sexual promiscuity" and related terms used in the ordinance and the breadth of the
standard "profitable, desirable, acceptable, respectable, praiseworthy or commonly ac-
cepted" made the ordinance unconstitutional.
140. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
141. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. at 214.
142. See text accompanying notes 161-67, infra.
143. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951).
144. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 593 (Wright, J., dissent-
ing).
145. Id.
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formed, and that the best means to that end is to open the
channels of communication rather than to close them."' This
observation, considered in view of the ineffectiveness of the ad-
vertising prohibition with reference to the state's interest,14 7
indicates that the prohibition actually helped to create, rather
than suppress, the evil with which the government was con-
cerned. Therefore, the advertising prohibition could not be up-
held under the clear and present danger test.
One final consideration in assessing the validity of a prohibi-
tion on advertisements is whether the advertisements are in
fact protected by commercial speech. The Virginia Pharmacy
Court's statement that speech which does no more than pro-
pose a commercial transaction does not lack all protection,148
might not conclusively establish the degree of protection af-
forded to all advertisements. The statement of the Court in
Linmark that it was simply holding that the ordinance there
which impaired "the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial
information" was constitutionally infirm,149 and the specific
holdings of the cases that have extended First Amendment
protection to commercial speech,150 suggest that an advertise-
ment lacking any legitimate or truthful commercial informa-
tion might not be afforded First Amendment protection. In this
vein, it has been suggested that emotionally conditioning ad-
vertising-that which portrays a product or service in proxim-
ity to certain emotional states which are unlikely to be present
in the manner suggested by the advertisement--does not per-
form the function of the speech protected by Virginia Phar-
macy and the other cases extending First Amendment
protection to commercial speech. Consequently, it is reasoned
that such advertisements are not to be afforded First Amend-
ment protection.' 5 '
It is more likely that a court in assessing the protection af-
forded commercial speech would weigh the value of the legiti-
146. 425 U.S. at 769.
147. See text accompanying note 28, supra.
148. 425 U.S. at 762.
149. Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 98.
150. See text accompanying notes 159-62, infra.
151. Reed & Coalson, supra note 133, at 778-79 (1977). This article gives as examples
of emotionally conditioning advertising those advertisements that represent the use of
soap powders and detergents as contributing substantially to sexual satisfaction or
happy feelings, when the use of the product is not in fact substantially likely to engen-
der the emotional satisfaction associated with its use in the advertisement.
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macy and truthfulness of the particular commercial speech
along with the other First Amendment interests presentedl 5 2
in the manner discussed below.
Having determined that the prohibition on broadcast ciga-
rette advertisements was not an otherwise permissible regula-
tion of commercial speech of the type discussed above, if a
court today were considering a First Amendment challenge
brought by consumers against the ban on broadcast cigarette
advertisements, it would probably determine the constitution-
ality of the regulation by applying the test enunciated in Bige-
low. 5 3 There the Court stated that a court may not escape the
test of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and
weighing it against the public interests allegedly served by the
regulation. 5 4
B. Weighing the Interests
1. The First Amendment Interests
The preceding review of cases shows that the First Amend-
ment interest justifying protection of commercial speech is the
function of advertising as a means of communicating ideas and
information which enable and encourage the individual to
make intelligent, informed economic decisions.5 5
The commercial speech affected by the prohibition on broad-
cast cigarette advertisements contained ideas and information
that facilitated making informed economic decisions. While
the advertising prohibition was specifically aimed at the adver-
tisements produced by the cigarette manufacturers, the indi-
rect effect of the prohibition was to stop the broadcasting of
effective anti-smoking advertisements. This was the case be-
cause stations that broadcast cigarette advertisements under
the fairness doctrine were required also to broadcast a number
of anti-smoking messages so that both sides of the controversy
surrounding smoking and its harmful effects on health would
be presented to the public.' Once the broadcasting of ciga-
152. See text accompanying notes 157-86, infra.
153. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 826; Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. at 91.
154. 421 U.S. at 826.
155. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 96; Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. at 763-65;
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 821-22.
156. See text accompanying notes 29-30, supra.
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rette advertisements was prohibited, however, the broadcast-
ers no longer were required to broadcast the effective anti-
smoking messages. Thus, the prohibition had the effect of sup-
pressing the discussion of cigarette smoking and the danger to
health which it poses. Moreover, such discussion was not to be
aired in the country's most persuasive communication forum,
the broadcast media.1 5 7
The recipients of this information had a strong First Amend-
ment interest in receiving it. First, there was a First Amend-
ment right to receive advertising. 5 1 Second, with reference to
the speech affected by the advertising prohibition, the recipi-
ents had a strong interest in receiving the information which
was suppressed. Although the regulated speech did not neces-
sarily contain the exact type of information that was contained
in the advertisements protected by the Court in Virginia Phar-
macy,5 9 Bigelow,'6 0 Bates 6 ' and Linmark,6 2 it was nonethe-
157. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 587-89. However, it is ques-
tionable today whether a broadcaster who legally broadcasts cigarette advertisements
would be required to carry anti-smoking messages under the fairness doctrine. See
text accompanying notes 248-54, infra.
In Capital, the majority discounted Judge Wright's dissenting position that cigarette
commercials implicitly state a position on a matter of public importance and as such
are entitled to First Amendment protection, by stating that the fact that cigarette ad-
vertising is covered by the FCC's fairness doctrine did not require a finding that it is to
be given full First Amendment protection. The majority based this conclusion upon
cases upholding the "commercial speech" doctrine that are now of limited authority in
light of more recent cases that have interpreted that doctrine. See text accompanying
notes 68-78, supra. In reaching this conclusion the majority also noted that Larus &
Brother Co., Inc. v. FCC, 447 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1971) "had recently upheld an FCC
ruling that 'smoking and health' [had] ceased to be a controversial issue." Id. at 585
n.10. In response, Judge Wright argued that this case
demonstrates . . . that the Public Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 had so suc-
ceeded in suppressing ventilation of the cigarette smoking controversy on ra-
dio and television that the controversy itself has disappeared from the
electronic media. Thus while the functioning of the First Amendment as to
this controversy has been frustrated on the nation's most pervasive informa-
tion outlets, the controversy itself has in no sense ended. Rather, it has
merely been shifted to other communications media where the fairness doc-
trine is not applicable and cigarette foes have no right to reply.
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 594 n.45 (Wright, J., dissenting).
158. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. at 757.
159. 425 U.S. 748. In Virginia Pharmacy, the recipients of the commercial speech
claimed the right to receive information concerning the prices of drugs which pharma-
cists wish to communicate to them through advertising and other promotional means.
The Court stated that
the particular consumer's interest. . . [in such a case] may be as keen, if not
keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debates. . ..
Those whom the suppression of the prescription drug price information hits
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less important information to the recipients since it related to
an important decision they have a right to make-whether or
not to impair their health by smoking.'6 3 This was particularly
true of the counter-advertisements which the prohibition effec-
tively removed from the broadcast industry. It is much more
difficult to contend that the cigarette advertisements them-
selves contained "information"; it could be easier to character-
ize them as containing appeals of little value to consumers
making important decisions. However, taken together, the ad-
vertisements and the counter-advertisements conveyed to con-
sumers information that would enable them to decide in an
informed manner whether or not to smoke.
The economic consequences of well-informed recipients' de-
cisions would be manifest in future insurance premiums and
medical bills, as well as in the availability of money that was
not spent on cigarettes. In addition, as in the case of the drug
price information considered in Virginia Pharmacy,16 4 the re-
ceipt of health information here could prevent physical suffer-
ing that might result if people who had not received
suppressed information chose to smoke. In addition, the regu-
the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportion-
ate amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet they
are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where
their scarce resources are best spent.
Id. at 763.
160. 421 U.S. 823. The Bigelow Court distinguished the advertisement it was exam-
ining from those examined in previous cases which denied commercial speech protec-
tion, on the basis that the advertisement, an abortion referral advertisement, did more
than simply proposed a commercial transaction. "It contained factual material of clear
'public interest,' "information concerning the legality and availability of abortions that
involved the exercise of the freedom of communicating and disseminating opinion. Id.
at 822.
161. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates, the Court held that truthful advertisements by
licensed attorneys, concerning the availability and terms of routine legal services,
were protected commercial speech. Id. at 357.
162. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). The Linmark Court held that posted "For Sale" or "Sold"
signs communicated "truthful and legitimate commercial information." Id. at 98.
"[WI ould-be purchasers of realty are no less interested in receiving information about
available property than are purchasers of other commodities receiving like informa-
tion about those commodities," and "the societal interest in the 'free flow of commer-
cial information' . . . is in no way lessened by the fact that the subject of the
commercial information here is realty rather than abortions or drugs." Id. at 92 (cita-
tions omitted).
163. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968). "We do not think the princi-
ple of free speech stands as a barrier to required broadcasting of facts and information
vital to an informed decision to smoke or not to smoke." Id. at 1103.
164. 425 U.S. at 764.
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lated speech provided cigarette smokers with information that
enabled them to choose from among competing brands those
cigarettes which might be less harmful to their health.
With reference to the argument that the broadcast prohibi-
tion was a control of communicative materials available to
youth, a group that the government has a right to protect with
more stringent controls than it could use in the case of
adults,15 it must be remembered that minors are entitled to a
significant measure of First Amendment protection and only in
relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may the gov-
ernment bar public dissemination of protected materials to
them.' In this case, the minors the government was allegedly
acting to protect had as strong an interest in receiving the in-
formation as did the adults.' The minors were also being fur-
nished with information highly relevant to the decision of
whether or not to smoke.
It can be argued that because they are not full participants in
the market system the need of children for the information
about the market is minimal.' However, the decision to
165. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court held that the state
has the power to protect minors from obscene material by making special provisions
for them that would reach beyond the scope of state power over adults. Id. at 638.
166. See text accompanying notes 134-41, supra.
167. Different considerations would have to be taken into account in determining
the constitutionality of a total prohibition on advertising aimed primarily at children.
Such a prohibition with respect to some or all children's advertisements has been pro-
posed. Complaint to FTC by Action for Children's Television, June 13, 1977; Thain,
Suffer the Hucksters to Come Unto the Little Children? Possible Restrictions of Televi-
sion Advertising to Children Under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 56
B.U. L. REv. 651 (1976); Complaint to FTC from Institute for Public Interest Law Repre-
sentation, Georgetown University Law Center, April 26, 1977. FTC Chairman Michael
Pertschuk has publicly stated that television advertisements of products possibly
harmful to children could be totally prohibited from the airwaves. Remarks of Michael
Pertschuk, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, before ACT Research Conference,
Boston, Mass., Nov. 8, 1977. Gerald Thain, a fomer FTC official, bases his conclusion on
the fact that children need protection, that they have a limited ability to interpret ad-
vertisements, and that these ads are unfair because they are against public policy,
inimical, unscrupulous, unethical and/or oppressive, and injurious to consumers. In
addition, Thain argues that
because children are not full participants in the market system, their need for
information about the market is minimal. In addition, the inability of children
to discriminate between commercial and noncommercial messages makes tel-
evision advertising a particularly inappropriate medium for conveying infor-
mation to children. Therefore, the considerations that argue for First




smoke is one that youth frequently makes. Since 1964, the per-
centage of teenage girls who smoke has almost doubled. 69 In a
major urban area on the west coast, one out of twenty children
is smoking by age eleven, and at age twelve, one out of five chil-
dren smokes.17 0 This indicates the need for children to have
access to the very information that the advertising prohibition
suppresses so they can make informed decisions about smok-
ing. In deciding that it was appropriate to have anti-smoking
messages appear on the broadcast media, the Banzhaf court
stated: "Where a controversial issue with potentially grave
consequences is left to each individual to decide for himself,
the need for an abundant and ready supply of relevant infor-
mation is too obvious to need belaboring."7 '
Furthermore, even if persuasive reasons were advanced sup-
porting the advertising prohibition because of the states' inter-
est in protecting their youth, such a regulation, which affects
the First Amendment interests of a group other than that
which the government is acting to protect, must be narrowly
drawn172 in order to avoid infringing on the interests of the un-
protectable class. In Capital, adults had significant First
Amendment interests in receiving the information conveyed
by the commercial speech affected by the prohibition. 7 3 More-
over, adults constituted a major part of the viewing audience of
those programs on which cigarette advertisements were run in
1966, 1967 and 1968. 17 Thus the advertising prohibition defi-
nitely affected information which adults would receive. By
regulating the advertisements through total prohibition of all
broadcast cigarette advertisements, the Act in effect arbitrarily
curtailed the adults' liberty to receive information.
Thus, if a state could present cogent arguments that regulat-
ing cigarette commercials was beneficial to children, these reg-
ulations would have to be narrowly drawn so as not unduly to
169. Address by Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare before the National Interagency Council on Smoking and Health, Shoreham Hotel,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 11, 1978).
170. Id.
171. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1089.
172. See text accompanying note 134, supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 154-60, supra.
174. See FTC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, Appendix B (June 30, 1969); FTC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Appendix D (June 30, 1968); FIC, Re-
port to Congress Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Ap-
pendix C (June 30, 1967).
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deprive adults of their right to receive such information.
Where a valid regulation with respect to one group would cur-
tail the rights of another group, the regulation must err on the
side of under-regulation. 7 1 Obviously, the regulation of broad-
cast cigarette advertisements failed to do this by prohibiting all
such advertisements. It shut off the flow of this information to
all audiences, including those that might otherwise legiti-
mately receive it.17
In addition to the interests of youths and adults in the infor-
mation affected by the regulation of broadcast cigarette adver-
tisements, there is a strong public interest in the free flow of
commercial information.177 As the Court in Virginia Phar-
macy stated, commercial messages may contain a great public
interest element.17  The Court cited several instances of com-
mercial messages containing such an element of public inter-
est:
advertisements stating that referral services for legal abortions
are available . .. that a manufacturer of artificial furs promotes
his product as an alternative to the extinction of his competi-
tors of fur-bearing mammals . .. and that a domestic producer
advertises his product as an alternative to imports that tend to
deprive American residents of their jobs. 79
It would appear that the commercial speech affected by the
advertising prohibition-the cigarette advertisements and the
anti-smoking messages-contained information of the same
sort contained in the advertisements cited in Virginia Phar-
macy. Therefore, they should probably be recognized as con-
taining a strong public interest element.
Moreover, as the Court pointed out in Virginia Pharmacy,
[s]o long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise econ-
omy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be
made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a
matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate,
be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of
commercial information is indispensable.18 0
The measure of resources being allocated by those deciding
175. Cf. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring) rev'd on other grounds, 438 U.S. 726 (1968).
176. See text accompanying notes 205-53, infra, for a discussion of alternative ap-
proaches to regulation.
177. 425 U.S. at 764.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 425 U.S. at 765.
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to smoke is indicated to some extent by the number of domes-
tic cigarette sales in 1974-594.5 billion.'' Further facts indica-
tive of the health consequences of smoking include: (1) in
1977, smoking was a major factor in 220,000 deaths from heart
disease, 78,000 lung cancer deaths, and 22,000 deaths from other
cancers; (2) 40 percent of all cancer in males is caused by
smoking; (3) 80 percent of deaths from bronchitis, emphysema
and other lung disease would not happen-if people stopped
smoking; (4) according to some estimates, smoking adds be-
tween $5 and $7 billion to health-care costs each year; and (5)
the cost of lost productivity, wages and absenteeism caused by
smoking is between $12 and $18 billion.18 2 The commercial
speech affected by the government's prohibition on broadcast
cigarette advertisements, as previously concluded,18 3 conveyed
information of importance to potential cigarette consumers, in-
formation which would help those consumers make intelligent
and well-informed decisions. Thus, the commercial speech
which was regulated concerned important public interests.
As previously noted,"' the fact that such information might
have been available from other sources is not determinative of
whether the regulation under consideration is valid." Even if
that were a determinative factor, all of the commercial speech
suppressed by the broadcast prohibition would not necessarily
be available from other sources since the anti-smoking adver-
tisements were only required of the broadcast media.
The foregoing analysis of the First Amendment interest
which a court would have to balance in this case has been
based upon the assumption that the fairness doctrine would
have required the inclusion of anti-smoking messages. If, how-
ever, the fairness doctrine were held inapplicable to cigarette
advertisements and as a consequence anti-smoking messages
were not required to be broadcast, then the cigarette advertise-
ments alone would be considered as the speech being regu-
181. FTC, Statistical Supplement to FTC Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public
Health Smoking Act (Dec. 31, 1974).
182. Address by Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, before the National Interagency Council on Smoking and Health, Shoreham Ho-
tel, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 11, 1978).
183. See text accompanying notes 131-36, supra.
184. See text accompanying notes 121-22, supra.
185. The relative uses of the various media should be considered in determining
whether the interests of the recipients of the information are sufficiently guarded. See
Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 93.
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lated in determining the extent of the First Amendment
interest. In such a case, the consumers' interests would be sig-
nificantly less than they would be if the anti-smoking messages
were present.
It might be argued that cigarette advertisements of the type
previously used 1 e are so devoid of any legitimate commercial
information of the kind protected in Bigelow, Virginia Phar-
macy, Bates, and Linmark, that they are not entitled to First
Amendment protection. However, it is more likely that the ad-
vertisements would be afforded some First Amendment pro-
tection.
In Banzhaf, the court expressed considerable doubt about
the amount of First Amendment protection applicable to ciga-
rette advertising."" Relying on the commercial speech doc-
trine, the court reasoned that product advertising is not
ordinarily associated with interests the First Amendment pro-
tects, but that it is more like a form of merchandising subject to
regulations consistent with those that other business practices
are subject to.' The court continued, stating that despite the
fact the FCC ruling requiring anti-smoking messages was
premised on the notion that cigarette advertising implies that
cigarette smoking is a desirable habit and thus implicitly states
a position on a matter of public controversy, the advertise-
ments contain no information or arguments in favor of smoking
that contribute to the public debate.'8 9 The court concluded
that even if cigarette advertisements were protected speech,
"they are at best a negligible 'part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of . . . slight social value as a step to truth. . . .'"190
This opinion, while questioning the First Amendment value of
cigarette advertisements, recognized that they are neverthe-
less probably entitled to some First Amendment protection.
This conclusion is supported by recent changes in the commer-
cial speech doctrine and in view of the First Amendment pro-
tection that Bigelow, Virginia Pharmacy, Bates and Linmark
afford commercial speech, it would seem that these commer-
cials would be protected to some minimal degree.
186. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8324, 8325 (1964), adding to 16 C.F.R. Part 408: "Unfair or De-
ceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazards of
Smoking."
187. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1101-02.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1102.
190. Id., citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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Furthermore, even if it were persuasively argued that ciga-
rette advertisements are devoid of any information entitled to
First Amendment protection, it would be a simple matter for
cigarette advertisers to add some information to their adver-
tisements, such as tar and nicotine content disclosures, as to
give the advertisements a minimal First Amendment value.
This suggests that by adding appropriate amounts of protected
legitimate commercial information to their advertisements,
cigarette manufacturers could manipulate the balance be-
tween the government's interests in banning the cigarette ad-
vertisements and the First Amendment interests at stake so
that a court would hold that the government's interest was out-
weighed and the ban unconstitutional. Of course, at some
point the cigarette manufacturers might find that their adver-
tisements contained so much valuable information that they
had become counterproductive and unprofitable. In that event,
advertisers might decide to shift the balance so that the gov-
ernment's interests would be of sufficient weight so as to make
the ban unconstitutional.
This indicates that if the fairness doctrine were not applica-
ble to cigarette advertising so that the only speech affected by
a ban on cigarette advertisements were the advertisements
and not the anti-smoking messages, the outcome of balancing
the First Amendment interests against the governmental inter-
ests would depend on the content of the advertisements. If the
advertisements contained information similar to that previ-
ously found in the anti-smoking messages, it would seem that
the First Amendment interests at stake would be the same as
those discussed above and that the outcome of a balancing of
the interests would be that suggested by this note. If however,
the advertisements contained less legitimate commercial infor-
mation, then the First Amendment interests at stake would be
diminished so that at some point, the governmental interests
would be of sufficient weight to effectively uphold the constitu-
tionality of the ban.
2. The Government Interest
If a court were today confronted with a First Amendment
challenge brought by consumers against the ban on broadcast
cigarette advertisements, it would weigh the justifications for
the advertising prohibition against the substantial individual
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and societal interests discussed above to determine if the pro-
hibition is constitutional.
In Capital, the government made several arguments for the
constitutionality of the ban. It argued that Congress could con-
stitutionally preclude a commercial practice that it perceived
as harmful to public health, especially when conducted over
radio and television."' The court, in deciding that the prohibi-
tion did not violate the Fifth Amendment by distinguishing be-
tween broadcast and other media, cited other arguments
advanced by the government that, in the court's opinion, con-
stituted a rational basis for the distinction and the prohibition.
The court stated that in 1969 Congress had convincing evidence
that the Labeling Act of 1965192 had not materially reduced the
incidence of cigarette smoking, and that substantial evidence
showed that the most persuasive advertising was being con-
ducted on radio and television, and that these broadcasts were
particularly effective in reaching a very large audience of
young people.9 3
In balancing the interests presented for and against the ad-
vertising ban, a court today would probably apply the test
enunciated in Bigelow. Bigelow held that "a court may not es-
cape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at
stake and weighing it against the public interest allegedly
served by the regulation.""' As shown above, the First
Amendment interest at stake in the case of the cigarette adver-
tising ban was substantial."' In contrast, the public interest
allegedly served by the cigarette advertising regulation was
weak. There is no merit in the government's argument sug-
gesting that the ban was constitutional because the advertise-
ments were particularly effective in reaching young people.
Young people have significant First Amendment interests
and, while subject to stricter government regulation than that
which is applied to adults, they should not be regulated any
more than is necessary and not to the extent that the First
Amendment rights of adults are affected. This suggests that
191. Brief for Defendant at 4, Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at
584-85.
192. The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat.
282 (1965), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (amended 1970).
193. 333 F. Supp. at 585-86.
194. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 826.
195. See text accompanying notes 154-90, supra.
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regulations less restrictive and more narrowly drawn would
have been in order.
The government's arguments are further weakened because,
while government regulations undertaken for the purpose of
protecting the public health are certainly legitimate,19 6 Bige-
low, Virginia Pharmacy and Linmark indicate that regula-
tions which affect substantial First Amendment rights (such as
those present in the Capital case), must be necessary, or they
will be deemed unconstitutional.19 7
In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court pointed out the weakness
of the government's argument that prohibitions on drug price
advertising were required to maintain high professional stan-
dards in the pharmaceutical business: professional standards
are guaranteed by other state regulations to which pharma-
cists are subject.9 8 Similarly, in Bigelow the government ar-
gued that the statute prohibiting advertisements for abortions
was required because the commercial operations of abortion
referral agencies are associated with practices, such as fee
splitting, that tend to diminish the quality of medical care.199
The government further contended that advertising of these
operations will lead women to seek services from those who
are interested only or mainly in financial gain rather than pro-
fessional integrity and responsibility.200 In response, the
Court stated that no claim had been made that this particular
advertisement in any way affected the quality of medical serv-
ices within Virginia.2 0' Finally, in Linmark, the Court con-
cluded that the prohibition of "Sold" and "For Sale" signs was
not necessary to promote stable, racially integrated housing,
because the evidence did not demonstrate that the town was
experiencing a substantial incidence of panic selling by white
homeowners.2 0 2
The parallel between the circumstances of these three cases
and the Capital case are striking: the commercial speech
purged from the airwaves by the prohibition of anti-smoking
196. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. at 767; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. at 827.
197. Id.; Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. at 768; Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. at 95.
198. 425 U.S. at 768.
199. 421 U.S. at 827.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 431 U.S. at 95.
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messages was the only speech that appeared to be effective in
furthering the government's interest in protecting the public
health. Thus, the ban on broadcast cigarette advertisements
was unnecessary because the end that the government thereby
sought to further was already to some extent being advanced,
and because the prohibition also suppressed certain speech
advancing the very interest the regulation was ostensibly
designed to further.2 0 3 The goal the government sought and
the apparent result of giving effect to the First Amendment in-
terests involved were actually one and the same-the reduc-
tion of cigarette consumption.
Furthermore, the broadcast ban in effect prevented the pub-
lic from obtaining information that would have aided it to make
better-informed decisions about smoking, which in turn could
have led to reduced cigarette consumption. Under Virginia
Pharmacy, the public has a First Amendment right to such in-
formation and the government ought to be opening the chan-
nels of communication, not closing them. 2 04
Therefore, not only is the advertising prohibition unneces-
sary, but the form of regulation fails because its approach is
contrary to the interests that the First Amendment protects.
This is not to say that any regulation of cigarette advertise-
ments attempted by the government would be unnecessary or
faulty in its approach, but rather that in the case of a ban on
broadcast cigarette advertisements, the First Amendment in-
terest at stake appears to outweigh the public interest alleg-
edly served by the regulation. Therefore, if a court were today
considering the ban on broadcast cigarette advertisements, it
would probably hold the ban unconstitutional.
IV
Alternatives to the Advertising Ban
The government could have relied upon several alternatives
to further both its own interest and the First Amendment in-
terests. The first alternative to a total prohibition of cigarette
advertisements that will be considered is the most obvious
one, leaving the situation as it was prior to the prohibition. As
203. See Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
204. 425 U.S. at 769-70. See text following note 140, supra.
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previously noted, after Banzhaf and the broadcasting of anti-
smoking messages, the statistics began to show a sustained
trend toward decreased cigarette consumption.' This would
offer a means to achieve the goal of reducing cigarette con-
sumption and protecting the public health, without seriously
infringing upon First Amendment rights to any greater extent
than had already occurred. 2 0 6  Since the anti-smoking
messages were apparently effective, the alternative of continu-
ing the broadcasting of anti-smoking messages would be a
more desirable approach than the counterproductive absolute
ban on all advertising.2 0 7
205. See text accompanying note 31, supra. The Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare recently proposed that the number of broadcast messages on smoking
and health be increased, citing the effectiveness of the anti-smoking messages aired
prior to the prohibition on broadcast cigarette advertisements. Address by Joseph A.
Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, before the National Inter-
agency Council on Smoking and Health, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 11,
1978).
206. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1101-03.
207. When Banzhafwas decided, the court, referring to First Amendment consider-
ations, stated that: "Finally, not only does the cigarette ruling not repress any informa-
tion, it serves affirmatively to provide information." Id. at 1103.
The effectiveness of anti-smoking messages in reducing cigarette consumption
might be decreased to some extent, however, by two circumstances that have reduced
the effectiveness of counter-advertisements on nutrition. These messages on nutrition
have been broadcast in response to food advertisements directed at children in an ef-
fort to correct misconceptions allegedly created by the food advertisements about
what constitutes good nutritional habits. First, the acceptance of the counter-adver-
tisements for airing and the times when they are shown are matters within the discre-
tion of the broadcasters. It is not uncommon for broadcasters to air nutritional
counter-advertisements during commercial breaks on late night programs. Conse-
quently, the counter-advertisements might not reach the same audience that views the
product commercials.
"The record of performance in children's television by the networks indicates that
they have not treated children's television as a unique public interest responsibility
that would require them to deviate from their profit maximizing behavior." A. Cross,
Food Advertising to Children on Television: Policy Considerations/Regulatory Alter-
natives (Jan. 1978) unpublished thesis in COMM/ENT Law Journal Library, at 11. An-
other consideration is that the economic resources available to product advertisers are
often substantially greater than what would be available to anyone who wanted to
make counter-advertisements regarding their products. The resources employed by
the cigarette manufacturers in developing their advertisements were quite substantial,
especially in comparison to the resources that might have been available to those who
constructed the counterads. Consequently, the cigarette advertisements might have
been more effective at accomplishing their objectives than the anti-smoking messages.
Such potential ineffectiveness of the anti-smoking messages was revealed in Banzhaf
when the court stated that "[tihe Commission has made no effort to dictate the con-
tent of the required cigarette broadcasts. It has emphasized that the responsibility for
content, source, specific volume, and precise timing rests with the good faith discretion
of the licensee." 405 F.2d at 1099. See note 157, supra.
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A. Voluntary Regulation
A second alternative to consider would be to allow the manu-
facturers and broadcasters to regulate cigarette advertising
themselves. Such an attempt at self-regulation was under-
taken by the manufacturers and broadcasters beginning in
1965,208 but the FTC concluded that although this form of regu-
lation resulted in some minor changes in advertisements, their
themes and basic impact remained unchanged.20 9 The FTC
stated that "[o] n their face the various advertising codes may
appear to set proper guidelines for cigarette advertising, but in
practice it is possible for cigarette manufacturers to comply
with the codes without making known the health hazards of
smoking or diminishing in any way the appeal of their advdr-
tisements."2 10
The true nature of the self-regulation may have been re-
vealed by the person who managed the New York office of the
Code Authority (the body responsible for self-regulating activi-
ties) until May 1, 1969, at which time he was asked to resign.2 1 '
He stated that, after a certain time, "the Code Authority ceased
trying to formulate its own policy on cigarette advertising, and
broadcast self-regulation became synonymous with trade asso-
ciation lobbying."2 12 Further, he stated that the National Asso-
ciation of Broadcasters (NAB) strategy "has been to avoid
meaningful self-regulatory action as long as the possibility ex-
ists that Congress will enact legislation favorable to the broad-
casting and tobacco industries."21 a Although NAB officials
have denied these last statements,2 14 self-regulation would not
appear to be a viable alternative.
B. Government Regulation
A third alternative to the prohibition on broadcast cigarette
advertisements could take the form of a less restrictive method
of government regulation. The two federal agencies most
likely to be involved in such a regulation effort are the FCC and
208. FIC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act,
24 (June 30, 1967).
209. Id. at 26.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 29.




the FTC. "Generally it is the FCC's role to deal with the quan-
tity of advertisements and the FTC's role to examine the con-
tent of advertisements."2 1 5
C. FTC Regulation
The FTC has been involved in regulating the content of ciga-
rette advertisement since 1964.216 In 1965, the FTC promul-
gated as a trade regulation its determination that in the sale or
distribution of cigarettes,
it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to fail to dis-
close clearly and prominently, in all advertising and on every
box . .. or other container in which cigarettes are sold to the
consuming public that cigarette smoking is dangerous to
health and may cause death from cancer or other diseases. 217
An FTC examination of cigarette advertising indicated that
two elements predominated: (1) a portrayal of the desirability
of smoking; and (2) assurances regarding the safety of
cigarettes or the relative safety of the advertised brand.2 18 The
Commission found that advertising heavily stressed the satis-
factions of smoking and frequently attempted to negate the
danger of smoking, without disclosing that danger.2 19 The
Commission stated that such advertising "actively stimulated
demand for the advertised brand by portraying smoking in
general and the advertised brand, in particular, as a satisfying,
desirable and attractive activity." 2 20 The FTC concluded that
since advertising was the principal vehicle of the manufactur-
ers' sales campaign, "it is important that cigarette advertising
be free of any false impression of the product's safety arising
from what is omitted as well as what is stated or implied."2 2 1
The Commission found that it was a deceptive act or practice
for an advertiser to make such representations concerning the
satisfaction to be derived from using so hazardous a product as
cigarettes without, at the same time, disclosing the dangers to
215. Thain, supra note 167, at 655.
216. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). See also F.T.C., Trade Regulation Rule for the
Prevention of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation
to the Health Hazards of Smoking and Accompanying Statement of Basis and Purpose
of Rule (1964).
217. 29 Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964), citing 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
218. Id. at 8341.
219. Id. at 8356.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 8357.
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health involved in its use.2 2 2
In addition, the FTC found that "cigarette advertising or la-
beling that does not disclose the health hazards of cigarette
smoking may be independently unlawful under section 5-
quite apart from the grounds previously advanced-because it
exploit [s] consumers, children, who are unable to protect
themselves!"223
As previously stated, to remedy this situation the FTC rule
required cigarette advertisements and packages to contain a
health warning.224 This rule was vacated by the Commission in
response to the preemption provisions of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act.2 25 This Act, which became effec-
tive January 1, 1966, requires a health warning.
The ineffectiveness of the remedy proposed by the FTC in
1964, and adopted by the Congress in 1965, has already been
noted.2 2 6 However, the basis for this remedy suggests alterna-
tive forms of regulation that a court deciding Capital today
might consider as a viable means of protecting First Amend-
ment rights of adults to receive the broadcast information as
well as protecting all recipients, adult and minor, from decep-
tive and unfair advertising practices.
First, since the apparent purpose of the required cigarette
health hazard warning was to balance out what would other-
wise have been an unfair or deceptive advertisement, more re-
vealing or prominent disclosures could have been required to
strike the desired balance. An example of such further disclo-
sure is contained in a 1969 FTC recommendation 2 27 that the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act be repealed
and, among other suggestions, that cigarette packages and all
cigarette advertising be required to include clearly and promi-
nently the following warning:
WARNING: CIGARETIE SMOKING Is DANGEROUS TO HEALTH AND
MAY CAUSE DEATH FROM CANCER, CORONARY HEART DISEASE,
222. Id. at 8356.
223. Id. at 8358, quoting FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
224. See text accompanying note 217, supra.
225. See FTC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
Act, at 30 (June 30, 1969), citing FTC News Release and accompanying Vacation of
Warning Requirements in Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Advertising and Label-
ing of Cigarettes, issued July 28, 1965.
226. See text accompanying note 28, supra.
227. FTC, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Ad-
vertising Act, 35 (June 30, 1969).
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CHRONIC BRONCHITIS, PULMONARY EMPHYSEMA AND OTHER Dis-
EASES. 22 8
Evidently in certain cases affirmative disclosures of this sort
have been effective in preventing deceptive advertisements.2 2 9
However, it is questionable that such affirmative disclosures
have this desired effect when a large portion of the audience
being deceived consists of preliterate or semiliterate children.
The utility of a written message in a case is extremely limited.
Such print advertising addressed at children would probably
have to be age specific in approach, "addressing the older,
more literate, portions of the child audience."2 3 0 In any event it
would appear that this alternative would not have the desired
effect with respect to younger preliterate children. With this in
mind, the broadcasting of cigarette advertisements containing
affirmative disclosures might be limited to times when children
who would not understand the cautionary warnings would not
be present in the viewing audience. However, in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,2 3 1 the court, in considering an FCC order
concerned with protecting children from indecent language,
noted that "large numbers of children are in the broadcast au-
dience until 1:30 a.m." 23 2 This suggests that a regulation re-
garding the time that broadcast cigarette advertisements could
be aired would be ineffectual. In addition, such a regulation
would be subject to attack as an infringement upon the First
Amendment rights of adults because "adults with normal
sleeping habits would be limited to advertisements fit for chil-
dren."2 3 3 Furthermore, such a regulation might have the effect
of a total prohibition on cigarette advertising since children
composed a large part of the audience that viewed the adver-
tisements that were originally broadcast and the manufactur-
ers might not find it worthwhile to limit their advertising to late
night television.
Secondly, when the FTC proposed that cigarette advertise-
ments include a health warning they also proposed as a rule
that:
228. Id. See note 37, supra.
229. See, e.g., Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists, Inc. v. FTC, 275 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960)
(requiring affirmative disclosure of inefficiency of product in treating most types of
baldness).
230. Thain, supra note 167, at 675.
231. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
232. Id. at 13.
233. Id. at 27.
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No cigarette advertisements shall state or imply, by words,
pictures, symbols, sounds, devices or demonstrations, or any
combination thereof, that smoking the advertised cigarettes
(a) promotes good health or physical well-being,
(b) is not a hazard to health. ... 234
The FTC did not adopt this second recommendation because
the cigarette industry had indicated to the FTC that it intended
to act voluntarily to end undesirable practices in the area cov-
ered by the rule-deceptive and unfair representations in ad-
vertising and labeling.23 5 The Commission concluded that it
was not necessary to adopt the above rule as a formal trade
regulation rule, "even though the record of [their] proceeding,
and their report, fully justified doing so."236 As previously
noted, the voluntary regulation undertaken by the industry
was predictably unsuccessful. 237
The basis for the rule was essentially the same as that for the
rule requiring the health warning. As mentioned, the purpose
of these rules was to make cigarette advertisements fair and
non-deceptive by balancing their content. The required health
warnings did this by adding information to the advertisements
which would counter the impression given by the ads that ciga-
rette smoking was a healthy and desirable activity. The second
rule would have balanced the advertisements by excising that
portion or those aspects of them that made them unfair or de-
ceptive without a warning. This rule would also have dealt
with the situation in which many young people decide to
smoke after having been exposed to massive advertising con-
stantly reiterating the attractions of smoking without warning
of the hazards involved.3
This second type of regulation could be founded upon other
FTC actions specifically related to protecting children. The
FTC has long recognized the need to afford special protection
to children. 23 9 As previously noted, the effects of cigarette ad-
vertising on children was one of the concerns of the FTC in
234. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8326 (1964).
235. See id. at 8364.
236. Id. But see Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98
(1977): "Laws dealing with false and misleading signs, and laws requiring such signs
to 'appear in such form or include such additional information . .. as [is] necessary to'
prevent [their] being deceptive . .. therefore, would raise very different constitutional
questions. We leave those questions for another day."
237. See text accompanying note 207, supra.
238. 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8359 (1964).
239. See id. at 8358.
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promulgating the rule discussed.24 0
In other situations the FTC has taken special measures to
protect children.241 For example, in In re Mattel, Inc., the FTC
considered complaints of alleged exploitation of children
through "special effects" achieved by lens use and sound tech-
niques exaggerating speed and maneuverability of toy cars. 24 2
The FTC ordered Mattel to cease and desist from, among other
things, portraying or describing in advertisements aimed at
children the performance or use of such products by or
through
the use of . .. Any film or camera techniques which result in
any visual perspective of such product which purports to be
but is not one which a child can experience in the ordinary use
of such product, when the effect of such visual perspective in
the context of the advertisement as a whole is to misrepresent
the product's performance, operation or use to the age group or
age groups of children to whom the advertisement is ad-
dressed, taking into consideration the level of knowledge, so-
phistication, maturity and experience of such age group or age
groups. 243
Since cigarette, advertisements were deceptive or unfair
when unaccompanied by a health warning and the health
warning appeared to be ineffective in countering the appeal of
the cigarette advertisements, the FTC, relying on Mattel, could
rule that cigarette advertisements portraying the satisfactions
of smoking and attempting to negate the dangers of smoking
were deceptive since they did not represent to children (or
adults, for that matter), the true functioning of the product.
This alternative to the total prohibition of cigarette advertise-
ments would require that they not apear in such form so as to
misrepresent their true nature.
Such a regulation might also be founded upon In re LT.T.
Continental Baking Co., 2 " in which the FTC considered the
charge that Wonder Bread advertising was deceptive and un-
fair because, in stressing special nutritional features of the
bread by broadcasting dramatic sequences of children's
growth, it "exploit [ed] the aspirations of children for rapid and
240. See text accompanying note 223, supra.
241. See 29 Fed. Reg. 8325, 8358 (1964).
242. 79 F.T.C. 667 (1971).
243. Id. at 672.
244. 83 F.T.C. 865, modified, 83 F.T.C. 1105 (1973), affd, 552 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1976).
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healthy growth and development." 2 4 5 The Commission held
that these advertisements were misleading.24 6 This case offers
no guidance, however, on the question of how to protect chil-
dren from such advertisements without infringing on the First
Amendment interests of adults.
D. FCC Regulation
Generally the FCC has authority to license broadcasters and
to refuse to renew the licenses of stations that do not operate
in "the public interest, convenience and necessity." 24 7 The
FCC deals with the quantity of advertisements that are broad-
cast.248
In addition, prior to the ban on cigarette advertisements, the
FCC required the broadcasting of anti-smoking messages. In
Banzhaf, the court decided that the FCC has the authority to
require broadcast media which carry cigarette advertising to
devote significant amounts of broadcast time to anti-smoking
messages. 249 However, in 1974 the FCC stated that in retro-
spect the application of the fairness doctrine to cigarette com-
mercials represented a serious departure from the doctrine's
purpose, which was to facilitate "the development of an in-
formed public opinion."250 The FCC based this conclusion on
the belief "that standard product commercials, such as the old
cigarette ads, make no meaningful contribution toward inform-
ing the public of any side of any issue."2 5 1 The FCC cited with
approval the statement of the Circuit Court of Appeals in
Banzhaf that product commercials are not ordinarily associ-
ated with interests that the First Amendment protects.25 2
The FCC concluded that in the future it would apply the fair-
ness doctrine only to commercials that are devoted in an "obvi-
ous and meaningful way to the discussion of public issues. "253
245. 83 F.T.C. 865, 872.
246. Id. at 964.
247. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), (d); 309(a), 312, 316 (1976). See NBC v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 215-17 (1943).
248. See Thain, supra note 167, at 655.
249. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1101.
250. The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public In-
terest Standards of the Communications Act [hereinafter cited as Fairness Report] 48
F.C.C.2d 1 (1974) (quoting Report on Editorializing, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949)).
251. Fairness Report, supra note 250, at 24.
252. Id. at 24-25. See also Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1101-02; Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. at 572 (1942). See text accompanying notes 187-90, supra.
253. Fairness Report, supra note 250, at 26.
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This FCC ruling might appear subject to challenge since it
relies to a large extent upon the commercial speech doctrine.
Supreme Court decisions affording commercial speech First
Amendment protection and recognizing its value in informing
the public would seem to cast doubt on the validity of the rul-
ing.25 4 It could be argued that cigarette advertisements do
present one side of a controversial issue, and that, conse-
quently, the fairness doctrine should be applied to them.
However, the FCC's position was upheld in National Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting v. FCC,2 55 which held that the
fairness doctrine was not triggered into application simply be-
cause commercial speech was protected under the First
Amendment.2 5 6 Thus, it is unlikely that the FCC would apply
the fairness doctrine to cigarette commercials.
E. Analysis of Alternatives
The first alternative suggested, leaving the situation the way
it was before the advertising ban, is the most attractive since it
was apparently effective in achieving the goal of reducing ciga-
rette consumption. But if the fairness doctrine were inapplica-
ble so that counter-advertisements were not required to be
broadcast, other forms of regulation would have more appeal.
Voluntary self-regulation by the manufacturers and broadcast-
ers does not appear to be a viable alternative in view of the
self-interests involved. FTC regulations requiring affirmative
disclosures are not very attractive because of the problems en-
countered in effectively communicating to the preliterate chil-
dren who make up a sizeable portion of most broadcasting
audiences. However, FTC regulations requiring manufactur-
ers to eliminate portions of advertisements that indicate smok-
ing promotes good health and well being or that it is not a
health hazard are attractive since they would seem to elimi-
nate the offenses that anti-smoking messages were designed to
counteract. Nevertheless, this untested form of regulation
would not be preferable to requiring anti-smoking messages,
which was a proven form of successful regulation. If, however,
the fairness doctrine were held not to be applicable to cigarette
advertisements and anti-smoking messages were not required,
this form of FTC regulation would merit strong consideration.
254. See note 153, supra.
255. 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926.
256. Id. at 1105-06.
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In view of the current FCC position on the application of the
fairness doctrine to cigarette advertisements and the fact that
the Commission is limited in perspective to only the quantity
of advertisements, the FCC does not appear to promise any at-
tractive alternatives.
Conclusion
Because of changes in the law concerning the First Amend-
ment protection afforded commercial speech, if the legislation
prohibiting broadcast cigarette advertisements were chal-
lenged today, and if consumers brought suit to enjoin its en-
forcement on the grounds that it violated their First
Amendment rights, a court would probably decide Capital dif-
ferently than it was decided in 1971. The court would probably
find that the government could achieve its goal of reducing cig-
arette consumption through alternative forms of advertising
regulation that would satisfy the state requirements without
unduly infringing upon the First Amendment rights of consum-
ers.
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